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Twenty-Nine Photographs and the 
Deterioration of  
the Missouri Relevance Rule 
State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
Luke A. Hawley* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Courts generally prohibit the admission of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence.1  The idea is that jurors should not be shown evidence if it has a 
substantially greater likelihood of prejudicing the jurors against the defendant 
than it does of helping them determine the facts of the case.2  Barring 
objections on other evidentiary grounds, if a piece of evidence provides 
substantially more probative than prejudicial value, the evidence can be 
shown to the jury.3   
 For decades, Missouri courts have limited the admissibility of unfairly 
prejudicial evidence.4  While federal courts are governed by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, Missouri is one of the few states that does not have an evidence 
code or stated rules of evidence.5  Instead, evidence in Missouri courts is 
governed by a loose body of case precedent and state statutes.6  Regarding 
prejudicial evidence in particular, Missouri courts are guided solely by case 
precedent.7  Missouri judges are given great latitude in determining whether 
evidence should be excluded based on its prejudicial nature.8  Abuse of that 
discretion can expose jurors to unfairly prejudicial testimony which may skew 
their perceptions of the defendant. 
 
* B.S., Political Science, University of Central Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021.  I would like to thank Professor Bowman 
for his insight during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for 
its help in the editing process. 
 1.  Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015). 
 2.  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015). 
 5.  Id. at § 102. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at § 403. 
 8.  Id. 
1
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 In State v. Wood, the Supreme Court of Missouri conducted an abuse of 
discretion review of the trial court’s decision to allow into evidence 
photographs of firearms that were not used in the commission of the murder.9  
The majority held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by 
overruling the defendant’s objection to the firearm evidence.10  Judge Stith 
provided the sole dissent, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing testimony and twenty-nine photos of guns that were unrelated to the 
charged crime.11  First, this Note argues that the majority’s opinion went 
against the great weight of Missouri precedent.  Next, this Note argues that 
the dissenting opinion more accurately portrays the state of prejudice law in 
Missouri.  Finally, this Note posits that the integrity of the criminal justice 
system is undermined by the result of Wood.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
 On February 18, 2014, Craig Wood killed ten-year-old Hailey Owens.12  
Owens was walking down a sidewalk near her home in Springfield, Missouri, 
when Wood pulled alongside her in a tan Ford Ranger pickup truck.13  Wood 
asked Owens for directions, but Owens kept walking.14  Wood opened the 
door and told Owens to come back.15  When Owens stepped back toward the 
truck, Wood pulled her into the truck and drove away.16  Two witnesses saw 
the incident, noted Wood’s license plate number, and called the police.17  
Police ran the license plate number and determined that the truck belonged to 
Wood’s parents with Wood being the primary driver.18  
That evening, Springfield police officers conducted surveillance of 
Wood’s home and observed a tan Ford Ranger pickup truck pull into the 
driveway at 8:30 p.m.19  The truck matched the license plate number that the 
witnesses had reported and officers approached.20  Wood exited the truck and 
tossed a roll of duct tape into the bed of the truck.21  Wood smelled like bleach 
and, when asked, acknowledged that he knew why the officers were there.22  
 
 9.  State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 575–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). 
 10.  Id. at 577 (majority opinion). 
 11.  Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 12.  Id. at 571–573 (majority opinion). 
 13.  Id. at 571. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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Wood complied with the officers and voluntarily went to the police 
station.23  Wood admitted that the tan Ford Ranger pickup truck was his, but 
Wood did not answer questions pertaining to Owens’s whereabouts.24  
Officers examined Wood and noted cuts on his lower lip and fingers, as well 
as marks near his neck and groin.25  Wood’s hat had been stained by bleach, 
and he stated he had purchased bleach and drain cleaner from the store that 
day.26  Wood also stated that he had dropped laundry off at the laundromat 
earlier in the day.27   
Before obtaining a warrant, officers went to Wood’s home and looked 
for Owens, entering through an unlocked door.28  They noted a strong odor of 
bleach coming from the basement.29  The floor and steps were wet, and there 
was also a scrap of duct-tape on the floor.30  There were bottles of bleach and 
plastic storage tubs.31  Unable to find Owens, officers left Wood’s home.32 
Later that evening, officers obtained a search warrant and returned to 
Wood’s home to conduct a more thorough search.33  In Wood’s bedroom, the 
officers found that his bed had been stripped of sheets and blankets.34  On 
Wood’s dresser, officers found a folder with handwritten fantasy stories of 
sexual encounters between an adult male and thirteen-year-old girls.35  The 
folder also contained photographs of female students at the middle school 
where Wood worked.36  
In the basement of Wood’s home, officers found Owens’s body wrapped 
in plastic bags and stuffed into a large plastic storage tub.37  Owens was naked, 
stiffened from rigor mortis, wet, and smelled of bleach.38  Owens had bruises 
and marks indicating that she had been tied by the wrists and attempted to free 
herself.39  Marks on Owens’s body also indicated that she had been sexually 
assaulted.40  
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 571–72. 
 26.  Id. at 572. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
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An autopsy showed that Owens died from a single gunshot to the back 
of her neck.41  Forensic analysis revealed that the wound came from a .22 
caliber bullet, passing through the base of Owens’s brain.42  The autopsy also 
showed that the killer had fired from point-blank range, placing the barrel of 
the gun on the back of Owens’s neck and pulling the trigger.43  Officers found 
a .22 caliber shell casing laying on the basement floor and concluded that the 
shell casing was fired from a .22 caliber Ruger 10/22 rifle that was locked in 
a gun safe in Wood’s storage room.44  In addition to the murder weapon found 
in the gun safe, officers also found several larger guns and gun accessories 
throughout the home.45  In Wood’s bedroom, officers found a shotgun leaning 
against the wall and a larger caliber handgun on the nightstand next to the 
bed.46   
The prosecutor charged Wood with one count of first-degree murder, 
one count of armed criminal action, one count of child kidnapping, one count 
of rape, and one count of sodomy.47  However, the state proceeded to trial 
only on the murder count.48   
During the guilt phase of the trial, Wood did not testify or present 
evidence.49  During his opening statement, Wood’s counsel argued that Wood 
did not deliberate before killing Owens.50  In response, the State’s closing 
argument emphasized the evidence that could lead the jury to believe Wood 
did, in fact, deliberate before killing Owens.51  The prosecutor stated, “I 
submit to you that when you place the muzzle, the end of the barrel of a gun, 
against the back of the base of the skull and you pull the trigger, there’s only 
one purpose you have, and that’s to kill someone. Your common sense tells 
you that.”52   
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State called Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Tucker to detail the firearms that law 
enforcement found in Wood’s home.53  Agent Tucker testified that Wood had 
a holstered .44 caliber pistol on the dining room table, a .45 caliber pistol on 
a nearby bookshelf, a .38 caliber revolver on a bookshelf, a gun case with two 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
47.  Brief for Appellant at 22, State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (No. 
96924).  
 48. Id.  The record is not clear as to why the State chose to proceed on only this 
charge. 
 49.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id.; See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (requiring deliberation before the killing 
in order for it meet the requirements of first-degree murder). 
 52.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572. 
 53.  Id. at 592 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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semiautomatic handguns, a pump action shotgun in the bedroom, a .40 caliber 
semiautomatic in the bedroom, a revolver in the storage room, a gun safe 
containing ten additional guns, and another pump action shotgun sitting 
outside the gun safe.54  As Agent Tucker described each gun, the jury was 
shown a photograph of the firearm.55  The State also asked Agent Tucker to 
describe his experiences finding weapon accessories such as Wood’s speed 
reloader, gun cases, ammunition, and reloading supplies.56  The State showed 
photos of these accessories to the jury as well.57  In total, the State published 
twenty-nine photographs of different weapons and accessories to the jury over 
Wood’s objection.58 
The State argued that Wood’s deliberation was evidenced by his decision 
to choose his smallest, quietest gun to commit the murder.59  The State 
presented this evidence in conjunction with the fact that Wood attempted to 
hide his crime by changing his sheets, bleaching and hiding Owens’s body, 
and disposing of Owens’s clothes as proof that he deliberately killed Owens.60  
After hearing this evidence, the jury convicted Wood of first-degree murder.61   
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State elicited testimony that 
there was no prior connection between Wood and Owens or her family.62  The 
State called a computer forensic examiner, who testified that after an Amber 
Alert was issued that listed Wood’s truck, one friend sent Wood a text 
message asking, “You haven’t been hunting, have you.”63  A second friend 
sent Wood a text message that said, “Oh great, I just got an Amber Alert for 
a gold Ford Ranger. What have you and [your dog] done???”64   
During the penalty phase of the trial, Wood presented evidence from his 
parents, his friends, guards from the Greene County Jail, and a priest.65  
Wood’s parents testified about Wood’s battle with depression and substance 
abuse, but also noted that he was employed and did not have a significant 
criminal history.66  Wood’s friends testified that they were surprised by 
Wood’s arrest because this type of crime was inconsistent with his normal 
character.67  One friend even recounted a story of Wood saving a man’s life 
in an apartment fire.68  Wood’s friends testified that they did not know Wood 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 53. 
 59.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572 (majority opinion). 
 60.  Id. at 572–73. 
 61.  Id. at 573. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
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had sexual fantasies about teenage girls.69  The priest testified that after 
Wood’s arrest, Wood renewed his faith, studied the Bible, and regularly met 
with the priest to discuss his crime.70  Additionally, the jail guards testified 
that Wood caused no problems in the jail besides one instance where he 
hoarded pills apparently for the purpose of attempting suicide.71  
The jury unanimously found several statutory aggravating 
circumstances, including that the murder of Owens involved torture and 
depravity, exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of human life, was 
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest, was committed against a 
potential witness in the investigation against Wood, and was committed while 
Wood engaged in rape, sodomy, and kidnapping.72  The jury did not determine 
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed these aggravating 
circumstances and  subsequently could not agree as to whether Wood should 
receive the death penalty.73  Because the jury was not able to unanimously 
decide Wood’s punishment, the circuit court decided Wood’s sentence 
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute Section 565.030.74  The circuit court 
held that the aggravating circumstances were found by the jury and 
determined that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating 
circumstances.75  Subsequently, the circuit court ruled that Wood should be 
sentenced to death.76 
Wood presented nine different points on appeal, challenging several of 
the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, the State’s closing argument, the 
decision to strike a juror for cause, and the constitutional validity of 
Missouri’s death penalty procedures that allowed the judge to sentence Wood 
to death without a unanimous finding by a jury.77   
This Note focuses on only one of Wood’s points on appeal: that the 
circuit court abused its discretion by admitting photographs and testimony 
concerning firearms that were not used in the commission of the crime.78  
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State was allowed to present, over 
Wood’s objection, twenty-nine photographs of guns and other accessories that 
were found in Wood’s home.79  The photographs showed that Wood had at 
least twenty guns of various types and sizes scattered throughout his home.80  
 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 573–574; see MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2018). 
 73.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 28. 
 74.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 574; see MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018) 
(explaining the procedure for shifting death penalty sentencing to judges when juries 
are unable to reach decisions). 
75.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 574. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 53. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
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The photographs also showed boxes of ammunition, gun cases, a speed 
reloader, and a reloading station.81  Wood objected to the photographs being 
logically irrelevant and prejudicial because the only purpose the State could 
have for admitting the photographs was to show that Wood is a “gun-crazed,” 
dangerous person with a propensity for violence.82  Wood argued on appeal 
that the testimony and evidence was so excessive and had such little probative 
value that it should have been excluded.83  Wood argued that by allowing this 
evidence, the circuit court violated Wood’s right to due process, a fair trial, 
and a fair and reliable sentencing proceeding, thereby warranting reversal.84 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court had not abused 
its discretion in overruling Wood’s objections to the evidence of firearms, 
ammunition, and related items that were found in Wood’s home.85 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 While the underlying principles for the evidentiary rules of relevance 
and prejudice are largely consistent among jurisdictions, the specific 
mechanism for the underlying rules may vary.  First, this Part discusses the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and their prohibition against irrelevant and overly 
prejudicial evidence.  Next, this Part introduces Missouri case law and 
highlights Missouri state courts’ treatment of relevance and prejudice.   
A. Federal Treatment of Relevance and Prejudice 
The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) restrict the trier of fact to 
considering only evidence that is material in deciding the case.86  FRE 402 
states that relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States, by Acts of Congress, by the FRE, or by 
other rules prescribed by the United States Supreme Court.87  FRE 402 also 
states that “[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.”88  FRE 401 provides the 
test for relevant evidence: “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”89  FRE 403 discusses 
the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, waste 
of time, or other reasons.90  FRE 403 provides that otherwise relevant evidence 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 575–76. 
 83.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 54. 
 84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 577. 
 86.  FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 90.  FED. R. EVID. 403.  FRE 403 also excludes evidence for misleading the jury, 
undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
7
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is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.91 
 One of the primary federal cases dealing with FRE 401, 402, and 403 is 
Old Chief v. United States.92  In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with 
violating a federal statute prohibiting the carrying of  firearms by convicted 
felons.93  The defendant attempted to stipulate that he had previously been 
convicted of a previous felony, asking the judge to instruct the jury of the 
defendant’s previous assault conviction rather than allow the state to present 
such evidence.94  The trial court allowed evidence of the defendant’s prior 
criminal conviction despite the defendant’s objection.95  The defendant 
challenged the decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing evidence that has substantially more prejudicial value than it does 
probative value.96  The Supreme Court discussed unfair prejudice as speaking 
to “the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder 
into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense 
charged.”97  The Court also highlighted the Committee Notes on FRE 403, 
stating that “[u]nfair prejudice within its context means an undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an 
emotional one.”98  The Court went on to note that when considering if 
evidence is more prejudicial than it is probative, the availability of other 
means of proof can be a valuable consideration.99  The Supreme Court went 
on to reverse the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the criminal 
record.100 
 Even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief, federal courts 
considered evidence of guns unrelated to the charged crime as unduly 
prejudicial.101  In United States v. Robinson, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Robinson’s conviction for bank 
robbery based on the improper admission of evidence pertaining to a .38 
caliber handgun found on Robinson’s person at the time of his arrest.102  
 
 91.  FED. R. EVID. 403.  The rule states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one of more 
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
 92.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S 172 (1997). 
 93.  Id. at 174–75. 
 94.  Id. at 175. 
 95.  Id. at 177. 
 96.  Id. at 180. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 180 (internal quotations omitted); see FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory 
committee’s notes. 
 99.  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. 
 100.  Id. at 178. 
 101.  See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
 102.  Id. at 613. 
8
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Robinson agreed that his firearm was relevant because FRE 401 would be 
satisfied if the firearm had “any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence in the determination of the action more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.”103  However, Robinson argued that 
evidence of his firearm lacked the necessary probative value to outweigh its 
prejudicial effect pursuant to FRE 403.104  The Second Circuit reversed 
Robinson’s conviction because Robinson’s firearm 
[E]stablished only a very weak inference at best that appellant was one 
of the bank robbers; it was likely to have had a significant prejudicial 
impact on the minds of the jurors; and, in the circumstances of this 
exceedingly close case, may be treated as sufficiently affecting the 
verdict that its admission requires reversal.105   
When analyzing the prejudicial value of the firearm, the court stated, 
“[T]he length of the chain of inferences necessary to connect the evidence 
with the ultimate fact to be proved necessarily lessens the probative value of 
the evidence, and may therefore render it more susceptible to exclusion 
as…prejudicial…”106 
 Both Old Chief and Robinson show how federal courts have treated the 
exclusion of evidence that has prejudicial impact substantially outweighing 
its probative value.107  While neither case is binding on the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s interpretation of prejudice, the analysis presented may be 
persuasive in Missouri because the Supreme Court of Missouri has 
historically treated federal court analysis of the FRE as persuasive when 
interpreting Missouri’s own rules of evidence.108 
B. Missouri Treatment of Relevance and Prejudice 
Similar to the federal rule, the general rule in Missouri is that relevance 
is a two-tier analysis requiring both logical and legal relevance.109  Like the 
FRE, evidence is logically relevant if it “tends to make the existence of a 
material fact more or less probable.”110  The Supreme Court of Missouri has 
noted that “[l]egal relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence 
against its costs – unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.”111  If the costs of the 
 
 103.  Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1203–04 n. 9 
(2nd Cir. 1970)). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 616. 
 106.  Id. (quoting Ravich, 421 F.2d at 1204 n. 10). 
 107.  Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191–192; Robinson, 544 F.2d at 616. 
 108.  See State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 109.  State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532, 546 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). 
 110.  State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 111.  Id. 
9
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evidence outweigh its benefits, even logically relevant evidence is excluded 
for lacking legal relevance.112  Generally, the greater the tendency of the 
evidence to prove or disprove a material matter of the case, the more likely 
that danger of prejudice will be outweighed and the evidence will be 
admitted.113  Historically, Missouri courts have held that evidence of firearms 
that were not used in the charged offense is inadmissible at trial as being 
unfairly prejudicial.114 
 One of the first Missouri cases to speak to the relevance of unrelated 
guns is State v. Wynne.115  In Wynne, the defendant shot the victim – her ex-
husband’s new wife – five times with a .25 caliber automatic pistol.116  Wynne 
defended her actions on both self-defense and insanity grounds, also claiming 
that she did not commit the murder and never possessed a gun.117  The 
defendant’s daughter testified that her mother’s ex-husband (the victim’s 
husband) carried a gun, and that gun was shown to the defendant on cross-
examination, over objection.118  The Supreme Court of Missouri overturned 
the conviction, articulating the general rule: “[W]eapons and objects not 
connected with the defendant or the crime are not admissible unless they 
possess some probative value.”119  The court went on to note that if the state 
is going to attempt to use this type of weapon as demonstrative evidence, the 
“evidence must meet the tests of relevancy, materiality, probative value and 
reasons of policy in the administration of justice.”120 
 Another leading Missouri case addressing the lack of probative value of 
guns unrelated to the charged crime is State v. Holbert.121  In Holbert, the 
defendant was arrested for the possession of a handgun.122  At trial, the 
prosecutor admitted evidence of two other guns in the defendant’s vehicle that 
were not the subject of the arrest.123  The defendant objected to evidence of 
the other two guns being irrelevant on the grounds that they tended to prove 
other offenses, that they were not admissible to prove intent on the present 
charge, and that they were inflammatory and offered only to create 
prejudice.124  The court overruled the defendant’s objections, and the 
defendant was convicted.125  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the 
 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015). 
 114.  See, e.g., State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App. W.D. 1978); State v. 
Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d. 294 (1944). 
 115.  Wynne, 182 S.W.2d. 294 (1944). 
 116.  Id. at 295. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 298–99. 
 119.  Id. at 299. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967). 
 122.  Id. at 130. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss3/11
2020] DETERIORATION OF THE RELEVANCE RULE 875 
guns that were unrelated to the charged offense had no legitimate probative 
value in establishing defendant’s guilt, and that their use throughout trial was 
prejudicial to the defendant.126  
After Holbert, Missouri cases continued addressing the highly 
prejudicial effects of introducing evidence of guns that are unrelated to the 
charged crime in cases like State v. Charles.127  In Charles, the defendant was 
charged with robbery and murder after he fatally shot a convenience store 
clerk.128  At trial, the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant on whether he 
had ever owned a handgun.129  When the defendant denied owning a handgun, 
the prosecutor entered the gun that the defendant had allegedly owned but not 
used in the alleged crime.130  The defendant was convicted, and the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Western District overruled the trial court, holding 
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a gun that was unrelated to 
the crime charged.131   
Lethal weapons completely unrelated to and unconnected with the 
criminal offense for which an accused is standing trial have a ring of 
prejudice seldom attached to other demonstrative evidence, and the 
appellate courts of this state have been quick to brand their admission 
into evidence, and any display of or reference to them during closing 
argument, as prejudicial error.132 
The Supreme Court of Missouri again ruled on the admissibility of 
firearms unrelated to the charged crime in State v. Hosier, and while the court 
allowed evidence of the firearm, they did so only for a specific reason.133  In 
Hosier, the defendant committed a murder and fled the scene.134  When police 
officers stopped the defendant, they found fourteen firearms and ammunition 
in his vehicle.135  When the prosecutor attempted to enter evidence of these 
firearms at trial, the defendant objected to the evidence being substantially 
more prejudicial than probative.136  The trial court allowed the evidence of the 
unrelated firearms and the defendant was convicted.137  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not err in allowing the 
evidence because the guns that were found in the defendant’s vehicle during 
his “direct flight” from the scene were relevant to show “consciousness of 
 
 126.  Id. at 133. 
 127.  State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). 
 128.  Id. at 194–95. 
 129.  Id. at 195. 
 130.  Id. at 196. 
 131.  Id. at 199. 
 132.  Id. at 198. 
 133.  State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 134.  Id. at 888–89. 
 135.  Id. at 890. 
 136.  Id. at 895. 
 137.  Id. 
11
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guilt.”138  However, the court did reaffirm the principal that “weapons 
unconnected with either the accused or the offense for which he is standing 
trial lack any probative value and their admission into evidence [was] 
inherently prejudicial.”139  
These cases exemplify the rule that firearms unrelated to the charged 
crime are unfairly prejudicial.  Because the prejudicial impact of these 
firearms outweighs their probative value, Missouri courts have traditionally 
held them to be inadmissible.140 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Wood contended he was 
improperly convicted and sentenced to death for a number of reasons, one 
being the admittance of twenty-nine photographs of unrelated firearms into 
evidence that substantially prejudiced the jury against him.141  Wood’s 
primary argument was that, under State v. Hosier, evidence of weapons not 
connected to the defendant or the offense in question are generally 
inadmissible.142   
Wood’s only defense during the guilt phase of the trial was that he lacked 
the requisite deliberation.143  The court held that “evidence of firearms of 
varying calibers and gauges found throughout Wood’s home shortly after he 
killed [Owens] was logically and legally relevant to show deliberation 
because it tended to prove Wood deliberately chose the smallest weapon from 
his collection to facilitate his efforts to cover up the murder.”144  The court 
also noted that, in addition to Wood passing up the other firearms in the home, 
the evidence showed that Wood had guns sitting in plain view in the bedroom 
where he raped Owens, thus somehow helping to establish deliberation.145  
Because the prosecution framed the firearms as relevant to prove deliberation, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by overruling Wood’s objection to the evidence of the firearms, 
ammunition, and related items found throughout the home.146   
 Judge Laura Denvir Stith dissented, disagreeing with the principal 
opinion’s determination that it was not prejudicial error to allow the 
 
 138.  Id. at 895–96. 
 139.  Id. at 895 (citing State v. Grant, 810 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. App. 1991)). 
 140.  See generally State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 199 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); 
State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. 
1944). 
 141.  Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 54. 
 142.  Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 895–96. 
 143.  State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); see MO. REV. 
STAT. § 565.020 (2018) (emphasizing “deliberation” as an element of first-degree 
murder). 
 144.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 576. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 577. 
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prosecution to introduce twenty-nine photographs of firearms that were not 
used in the murder.147  Judge Stith analyzed decades of Missouri case law, 
including cases like Wynne and Holbert, finding that Missouri courts have 
consistently recognized that admitting evidence of weapons unconnected to 
the charged offense inherently causes prejudice and subsequently constitutes 
reverRsible error.148  While Judge Stith acknowledged that Wood’s killing of 
Owens was horrific, her dissent noted that this case does “not justify the 
jettisoning of decades of caselaw.”149 
Judge Stith rejected the principal opinion’s argument that the twenty-
nine photographs were relevant for the purposes of proving deliberation.150  
Judge Stith noted that mere logical relevance is insufficient to establish 
admissibility – the circuit court must also determine evidence’s legal 
relevance by weighing its probative value against its unfair prejudice.151  
Judge Stith’s argument was that the principal opinion erred in conducting this 
balancing test.152  
Judge Stith also argued that, if deliberation had truly been the issue, the 
prosecutor could have simply elicited testimony that Wood possessed multiple 
guns and chose the smallest of those guns to commit the crime, rather than 
show the jury photos of each of these guns.153  If introducing photographic 
evidence was so important, Judge Stith argued that the State could have 
admitted a picture of one or two of Wood’s guns that he passed up on.154  
Judge Stith went on to note that, instead of utilizing these other means of 
proving deliberation, the circuit court allowed the photographs of these 
firearms to become “the centerpiece of the trial,” going beyond what is 
necessary to present relevant facts.155  Specifically, Judge Stith took issue with 
the evidence presented by FBI Special Agent Tucker, who testified at length 
about more than twenty firearms that were found in Wood’s home.156   
Judge Stith posited that the circuit court and the majority opinion failed 
to acknowledge the large breadth of Missouri case law dealing with 
prejudicial evidence.157  Judge Stith stated simply:  
The circuit court then had a duty to weigh the probative value of each 
additional piece of gun evidence against the inherently prejudicial 
nature of gun evidence. From the record, it appears the circuit court 
skipped this step and simply admitted evidence en masse after finding 
 
 147.  Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 148.  Id. at 591–593. 
 149.  Id. at 591. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 592; see State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 152.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 593 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 153.  Id. at 592. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 591–593.  
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slight relevance without considering evidence as to a particular gun or 
accessory to determine whether this additional evidence actually was 
legally relevant, and how to limit its prejudicial impact. This was 
error.158 
Judge Stith also argued that the trial court’s error was not harmless.159  
The jury in this case was deadlocked as to the punishment that the defendant 
should receive.160  In Missouri, if a jury is deadlocked as to the punishment 
that a defendant in a murder case should receive, the trial court itself can use 
its discretion and determine the defendant’s sentence.161  Subsequently, Judge 
Stith noted that, but for this prejudicial firearm evidence, the jury may have 
deliberated differently and kept the determination out of the judge’s hands 
altogether.162  For this reason, Judge Stith found that the introduction of 
photographs of these unrelated weapons is prejudicial error warranting 
reversal.163 
The majority argued against Judge Stith’s dissent, asserting that the 
dissenting opinion improperly relied on fundamentally distinguishable 
cases.164  Essentially, the majority argued that because Judge Stith cited cases 
where the actual firearms were admitted into evidence rather than photographs 
like were admitted in this case, Judge Stith’s dissent misapplies the law.165  
However, the majority cites no legal authority to support its discrediting the 
foundation of Judge Stith’s argument.166  Additionally, the principal opinion 
argued that the dissent “overlook[ed] the fact that the logical and legal 
relevance was amplified by the number of weapons precisely because it 
showed Wood deliberately chose the .22-caliber rifle even though multiple 
other weapons were more readily accessible.”167  Lastly, the majority argued 
that the dissenting opinion was incorrect because the prejudicial effect of the 
firearms was minimized by the admittance of mere photographs rather than 
the actual weapons.168 
V. COMMENT 
The precedent established by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision 
in Wood leaves criminal defendants susceptible to becoming victims to 
wanton prejudice.  By allowing twenty-nine photographs of weapons that 
 
 158.  Id. at 593. 
 159.  Id. at 594. 
 160.  Id. at 594. 
 161.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018). 
 162.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 594 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 576–77 (majority opinion). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
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were wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the court defies decades of 
Missouri case law that has historically served as a safeguard for the rights of 
criminal defendants.169  Missouri courts have continually held that when a 
person is put on trial for a criminal charge, only evidence that is both logically 
and legally relevant to that crime should be shown to the jury.170  Evidence is 
logically relevant if it “tends to make the existence of a material fact more or 
less probable.”171  Evidence is legally relevant only if its probative value 
outweighs its costs.172  The rule in Missouri has historically been that trial 
courts must conduct a balancing test with each piece of evidence: the 
probative value of the evidence must be weighed against the evidence’s 
prejudicial value, and if the prejudicial value substantially outweighs the 
probative value, that evidence should be excluded in the interest of fairness 
and justice.173  
The only probative value of the twenty-nine photographs in this case was 
that Wood’s possession of these firearms could potentially show that he 
picked out the smallest, quietest gun.174  However, this argument fails on two 
distinct grounds: first, it relies on inferences that are wholly unsupported by 
the record, and second, it assumes the firearm photos were the only means of 
proving deliberation.  
The State’s argument that the photographs prove deliberation is wholly 
inconsistent with the testimony as it was presented at trial.175  The State argues 
that the photographs prove deliberation because Wood purposefully chose the 
smallest of his firearms to commit the murder in an attempt to cover up his 
crime.176  However, this argument is based on mere speculation, delving into 
Wood’s mindset to say that he must have purposely passed up all of his other 
firearms on his way to the murder weapon.  Nowhere in the record do any of 
the parties state that there is evidence of this deliberation.  This argument also 
infers that, if Wood purposely passed up his other firearms in favor of his .22, 
he presumptively did so because it would be the quietest and easiest to cover 
up.  Without more evidence to tie this argument to what actually happened 
leading up to Owens’s murder, the State’s argument fails by requiring such a 
great leap of inference and blatant speculation.  
As Judge Stith noted in her dissent, the State could have proven Wood’s 
deliberation by mere testimony about the firearms that Wood kept in his 
 
 169.  Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 170.  See, e.g., State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817–18 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); 
State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 171.  Anderson, 716 S.W.3d at 276. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See, e.g., State v. Perry, 689 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. App. 1985); State v. 
Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. App. 1978); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294, 
300 (Mo. 1944). 
 174.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 576, 592. 
 175.  Id. at 573 (discussing the testimony presented at trial bolstering Wood’s 
character). 
 176.  Id. at 576. 
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home.177  Additionally, the State could have proven the existence of other 
possible guns by showing the jury a photo of one or two guns that Wood 
passed up on his way to retrieve the .22-caliber rifle.  Rather, the State chose 
to show the jury twenty-nine photographs of the firearms and related 
accessories because the prosecutor knew that the images would paint Wood 
in a light that was favorable to the State.178   
If the State’s sole motive in admitting the firearm photographs was to 
prove Wood’s deliberation, the prosecutor could have elicited alternative 
testimony to show that Wood deliberated before killing Owens.  The State 
could have relied merely on their argument that Wood’s deliberation was 
evidenced by his placing his gun to Owens’ head and pulling the trigger.179  
The State could have proven Wood’s deliberation through evidence of 
Wood’s notebook by showing that Wood entertained fantasies of harming 
young girls.180  The State could have proven Wood’s deliberation by 
introducing text messages from Wood’s phone that show Wood discussed 
“hunting” with his friends.181  If the State actually cared about proving 
Wood’s deliberation, the prosecutor could have elicited testimony regarding 
Wood’s coverup of his crime, as evidenced by his purchase and subsequent 
use of bleach and plastic tubs.182  While the State argues that deliberation was 
proven through these twenty-nine photographs of unrelated firearms, this 
argument incorrectly presumes that Wood’s deliberation could not have been 
shown through alternative, less prejudicial means. 
What the defendant did in this case was deplorable.  He killed an 
innocent little girl, and the State was certainly correct to prosecute him 
accordingly.  Nevertheless, our legal system provides rules of evidence for a 
reason.  The rules of evidence ensure that every citizen is given a fair 
opportunity to defend him or herself, regardless of how morally reprehensible 
his or her conduct may be.  While it may be easy to look at these rules 
differently in cases where defendants deserve punishment for their actions, 
that does not make it right.  Courts cannot abandon the principles of justice 
that our nation is built upon simply because it is convenient.  
Because the prejudicial nature of this evidence so vastly outweighs any 
probative evidence of deliberation, the Supreme Court of Missouri wrongly 
decided Wood. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri has set a 
dangerous precedent that could allow prosecutors to ignore the previously 
required balancing test and present prejudicial evidence with little regard for 
justice. 
 
 177.  Missouri courts have historically held that introduction of weapons or other 
demonstrative evidence, especially when such evidence is unrelated to the charged 
crime, unfairly prejudices jurors against the defendant more than mere testimony.  See, 
e.g., State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294, 288–289 (Mo. 1944). 
 178.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 592–593 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
179.  Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572.  
180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 573 (majority opinion). 
 182.  Id. at 572. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 In State v. Wood, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not reverse the trial 
court’s decision to admit twenty-nine photographs of firearms and related 
accessories that were not involved in the disputed murder.183  The court’s 
decision goes against the great weight of Missouri case precedent.184 As a 
result, the court’s decision sets a new standard, allowing prosecutors to 
disregard the rules of evidence prohibiting introduction of evidence with 
probative value that is outweighed by its prejudicial value.  This precedent 
certainly damages those similarly situated to Wood, but it also casts a shadow 
over the Missouri criminal justice system by allowing trial courts to utilize 






 183.  Id. at 577. 
 184.  See, e.g., State v. Perry, 689 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. App. 1985) (“The courts 
of this state, with notable consistency, have recognized that weapons unconnected 
with either the accused or the offense for which he is standing trial lack any probative 
value and their admission into evidence is inherently prejudicial and constitutes 
reversible error.”); State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. App. 1978) (“Lethal 
weapons completely unrelated to and unconnected with the criminal offense for which 
an accused is standing trial have a ring of prejudice seldom attached to other 
demonstrative evidence, and the appellate courts of this state have been quick to brand 
their admission into evidence, and any display of or reference to them during closing 
argument, as prejudicial error.”); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294, 300 (Mo. 1944) 
(“The objection to the introduction of weapons or other demonstrative evidence, 
especially when not connected with the defendant or his crime, on the ground of unfair 
prejudice is based on sound psychological and philosophical principles.”). 
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